Renunciation Agreement Deutsch

In December 1934, a secret ministerial committee met to discuss the situation of German rearmament. Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, told a meeting of the committee that “if the alternative to legalising German rearmament is to prevent it, there would be everything to say not to legalise it.” [30] However, since London had already rejected the idea of a war to end German rearmament, the British government chose a diplomatic strategy to replace Part V in exchange for Germany`s return to the League of Nations and the World Conference on Disarmament. [30] At the same meeting, Simon said: “Germany would, it seems, prefer to be an honest woman; but if it stays too long to engage in illegitimate practices and find from experience that it does not suffer from it, this laudable ambition can wear out. [31] In January 1935, Simon wrote to Georg V.: “The practical choice is between a Germany that continues to arm itself without any regulation or agreement, and a Germany that enters the community of nations through the recognition of its rights and certain changes in peace treaties and contributes in this way or another to European stability.” Between these two courses, there can be no doubt as to who is the smartest. [32] In February 1935, a summit between French Prime Minister Pierre Laval and British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald led to an Anglo-French communiqué in London proposing discussions with the Germans on arms control, an air pact and security pacts for Eastern Europe and nations along the Danube. [33] When the Navy began planning a war with the United Kingdom in May 1938, the Senior Naval Officer, Commander Hellmuth Heye, concluded the best strategy for the Navy as a fleet of submarine cruisers, light cruisers and armoured vessels used in tandem. [50] He criticized the existing construction priorities dictated by the agreement, as there was no realistic possibility of a German “balanced fleet” defeating the Royal Navy. [50] In response, senior German naval officers began to commit to a transition to a cross-war fleet that adopted a trajectory guerrilla strategy to attack the British merchant navy, but they were rejected by Hitler, who insisted on Germany`s prestige to build a “balanced fleet”. Such a fleet would attempt a Mahanian strategy of gaining maritime dominance through a decisive battle with the Royal Navy in the North Sea. [51] Historians such as Joseph Maiolo, Geoffrey Till and the authors of the Navy Official History agree with Chatfield`s assertion that a cross-war fleet offers Germany the best chance of damaging the power of the United Kingdom and that the United Kingdom benefited strategically by ensuring that such a fleet was not built in the 1930s. [52] In early March 1935, discussions took place on the extent and extent of German rearmament in Berlin, when Hitler and Hitler were postponed. In a British government white paper justifying a higher defence budget on the grounds that Germany was violating the Treaty of Versaille, he claimed to have attracted a “cold”.